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South Africa is known to have the largest HIV epidemic in the world with 5.7 
million people currently living with HIV (UNAIDS). In view of the scope of the 
HIV/AIDS crisis, South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) has led a broader 
social movement to increase access to HIV/AIDS treatments. As a leading social 
movement organization (SMO), TAC addresses the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa 
through multiple means. Identifying the government as a key actor, TAC has fought for 
health programs and policies, as well as adherence to the policies put in place. Next, 
realizing the need for drug therapy TAC has targeted pharmaceutical companies to make 
HIV treatment more accessible. Thirdly, recognizing the needs of various groups 
impacted by the disease, TAC has implemented programs to address the needs of 
especially vulnerable communities such as pregnant women with HIV, youth, and 
immigrant and refugee populations.   
Since the founding of the organization a decade ago, the Treatment Action 
Campaign has been highly acclaimed within the country and sub-Saharan region as a 
model organization within the HIV/AIDS social movement.  TAC has been recognized 
for the success it has achieved in 2003 as the recipient of the Nelson Mandela Award for 
Health and Human Rights and prides itself as a 2004 Nobel Peace Prize nominee.  
Now, I seek to investigate whether or not the Treatment Action Campaign is truly 
successful. First I will define the parameters within which to measure success.  I will 
grapple with questions such as: what defines success and how can it be measured? By 
what criteria can TAC’s performance be measured? What conditions are necessary to 
achieve success?  
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Moreover, given that TAC is a highly recognized and celebrated group, one might 
wonder why TAC has not achieved more. Provided that TAC fits the criteria for 
possessing the qualities of a potentially “successful” group, could it be discovered that it 
has not achieved the success that is expected of this sort of organization? Through this 
paper, I will set up a framework to measure TAC’s success and then use it to assess its 
political and social/cultural outcomes. TAC’s political strategies are well-known and 
seem to be successful at first glance. On the other hand, measuring social and cultural 
outcome will be much more difficult due to the subjectivity of the matter.  
Overall measuring the political outcome (i.e. the creation of treatment programs 
and health policies) has been straightforward, but I have found that measuring the social 
and cultural outcome of the social movement on HIV/AIDS is more complex. There is 
much more ambiguity in the measurement of social and cultural outcomes.   
Nevertheless, I will attempt to determine whether or not TAC has met its potential and if 
TAC is truly a successful social movement organization.  
 
 
LITERATURE ON THE ASSESSMENT OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT SUCCESS 
 
 The Treatment Action Campaign of South Africa is well known in the sub-
Saharan region and highly acclaimed for its efforts to thwart progression of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. It is my aim to examine TAC within the social movement discourse 
in order to determine its success. Many scholars have theorized about what is necessary 
for a social movement to thrive given the political and social climate. Scholars often 
examine collective action through theories such as the political process theory and 
resource mobilization theory, distinguishing what is necessary in order for a social 
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movement to generate successful collective action. Within the discussion of the evolution 
of social movements, there is an ongoing debate as to how to measure success. The 
dialogue of what constitutes success and what measures are appropriate for determining 
success has yet to come to conclusion. The units of analysis explored by social movement 
scholars vary. Some scholars focus on political impacts while others examine cultural or 
social impacts of the social movement. There is disagreement over which indicators 
should be considered in order to determine social movement success and a gamut of 
possibilities has been explored.  
 The emergence of collective behavior gave rise to theories which guide social 
movement research such as the political process model. Scholars of political process 
theory present the case that mobilization takes place in the wake of specific political 
opportunities, placing emphasis on the external political environment being conducive to 
the movement’s goals and initiatives (Bernstein 2003, 358). According to the political 
process model, movements are likely to develop and emerge during times of favorable 
external political conditions which present opportunities to groups in weak social 
positions the incentive to be potential challengers (Morris 2000, 446). Morris (2000) 
claims that in order for groups to engage in successful collective action, they must be 
exposed to an external political opportunity which is advantageous for the challenging 
group. 
Another social movement theory stresses the aggregation of resources, which 
includes but is not limited to resources such as money and labor. This approach, known 
as resource mobilization theory, is at the core of Giugni’s (2004) study of organizational 
variables and success of social movements. Resource mobilization theory places social 
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organization as a precondition for collective action, while also emphasizing the ability to 
mobilize appropriate resources for collective action to take place. Giugni follows the 
central argument of Gamson in Strategy of Social Protest, referring to Gamson’s work as 
the most systematic inquiry of social movement impact and effectiveness. Gamson 
(1990) examined the trends and tactics of social movements that achieved success. His 
study of social movement theory included organizational structure, external crises, and 
the movement’s use of violence and then finally correlated these features with the 
movement’s overall success.  
Another scholar on resource mobilization theory, Jenkins (1983) expands on 
social movement theory, adding that resources can be accumulated in not only tangible, 
but also intangible forms. Tangible resources are those such as money, facilities, and 
means of communication, whereas intangible resources are those of “human” assets such 
as organizing and legal skills of participants, and unspecialized labor from supporters 
(Jenkins 1983, 533). Both sets of resources are vital to operating towards a movement’s 
goals. 
Furthermore, Jenkins explains that resource mobilization theorists view social 
movements as extensions of institutionalized actions. These theorists argue that social 
movements can attempt to influence the elements of social structure and organize groups 
that have previously been unorganized against the institutional elite for example, through 
legal reform. As a result, social movements must carry out clearly defined, rational 
actions in order to pursue their specified interests and fixed goals.  
 These theories, while looking at the conditions in which social movements arise, 
hint at the ways in which success of social movements can be determined. Each theory, 
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examining the political backdrop or the ability to mobilize resources, shows what 
elements may be necessary to achieve success. Scholars have utilized these theories in 
order to identify indicators of social movement success. Some have targeted political and 
legislative outcomes as the key indicators of success while others argue that consideration 
of social and cultural outcomes are also relevant. These are primarily external indicators 
of success, meaning that the results occur within the external targeted group such as the 
institutional elite or specific governmental policies.  
Meanwhile, other scholars examine internal indicators of success, which are the 
internal results and benefits that are experienced by the participants of the social 
movement. Internal factors themselves may play a significant role in affecting the 
mobilization potential of the movement.  
 Scholars Tilly and Tarrow (2007) look at three other effects of social movements, 
examining both external and internal impacts. First, they examine the direct external 
impact of social movement campaigns on public policies. Second, they examine the 
internal impact on the lives of activists by observing the effects of participation in claim-
making campaigns. And thirdly, they examine the effect of outside campaigns on the 
social movement itself. Their work primarily involves campaigns that organize public 
efforts to make collective claims on those in authority. This approach incorporates 
external as well as internal impacts of a social movement’s actions while also considering 
the effects of involvement within the social movement as a whole. 
 Giugni (2004) also examines the external impact on public policy, although he 
stresses the importance of internal variables and resource mobilization as contributing 
factors in the determination of the group’s success. Following Gamson’s foundational 
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work, Giugni (2004) proposes the following areas of movement success: policy change, 
change in policy process, and changes in social values. Giugni’s determination of success 
is dependent upon changes seen externally rather than internally within the social 
movement.  
 Providing another alternative, Brown (2005) turns to a different set of categories 
to assess movement impact and success. Brown measures the success of social movement 
organizations through the assessment of what he calls “outcome success”, “legislative 
success,” and “perceived success”. The first measure, outcome success, requires 
examination of the collective benefits and actual changes for the members of the group. 
Brown argues that this is the ultimate measure of success. Outcome success, as described 
by Brown, depends on the combination of the context in which the organization works 
and the specific demands and tactics implemented by the group in order to achieve their 
goals. Other variables can also influence the attainment of outcome success, such as the 
influence of the national government, public opinion, and policy changes.  
Next on Brown’s set of categories is legislative or policy success, which is 
“typically measured in terms of policy gains through changes in laws and allocation of 
money” (Brown 2005, 12). Political change, an external impact, is often cited by various 
social movement scholars as previously noted. In the same vein, Brown explains 
legislative success as the changes seen within the government’s legislative body through 
which the social movement’s goals are realized. The implementation of policy change or 
new programs does not guarantee that the group’s goals will be realized. But Brown sees 
legislative change as “benchmarks on the road to real change” (2005, 11). 
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And lastly, perceived success is the internal perception of success. This means 
that the organization and its leaders determine the extent to which they believe they have 
been successful. This measure is very subjective and depends on the goals and 
expectations the group has of itself. This measure of success will be heavily reliant upon 
internal operations of the group, which can greatly influence the group’s ability to 
achieve outcome and legislative success. Brown notes that the greater the degree of 
radicalism of the group’s goals, the lower the rate of achievement (Brown 2005, 17). 
These categories of success measurement take into account internal and external factors 
that influence a group’s operation and results of their campaigns.  
 On the other hand, Bernstein (2003) presents another set of categories through 
which to determine social movement success. The categories, originally framed by 
Staggenborg (1995), include political and policy outcomes, mobilization outcomes and 
cultural outcomes. Bernstein focuses on the relationship between various strategies and 
outcomes used by activists, usually finding that the political opportunities highly 
influence strategic choices and in turn, the results achieved. Scholars of political process 
theory argue that mobilization takes place in light of specific political opportunities, 
placing emphasis on the external political environment being conducive to the 
movement’s goals and initiatives. Although true, Bernstein also emphasizes that the 
strategic choices of activists are a result of how they understand the relationship between 
mobilization, political, and cultural effects. 
 As many scholars examine political impacts as determinants of success, powerful 
political actors usually dominate the spotlight. However, Morris (2000) urges 
consideration of the impact of human agency, not only from powerful political actors but 
11 
 
also challengers in less powerful positions. Morris argues that the importance of non-elite 
players, such as grassroots volunteers, is often overlooked in the success of social 
movements. As mentioned earlier, these grassroots actors serve as internal resources to 
the social movement.  
 In order to assess the success of the Treatment Action Campaign, it will be 
necessary to examine resource mobilization and political opportunity as explained by 
Giugni and Bernstein. Jenkin’s offers insight into the internal and external resources 
involved in resource mobilization. Morris highlights the importance of non-elite players, 
who are crucial to TAC’s grassroots operation to recruit members. Consideration of non-
elite actors is instrumental to TAC’s ability to mobilize human resources.  
 Indeed, social movement scholars have provided a plethora of ways in which to 
measure success. My study of the Treatment Action Campaign, using the political 
process model and resource mobilization model, will allow for examination of both 
internal and external factors influencing the organization’s effectiveness in the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa. Given South Africa’s unique political history and 
scope of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, examination of the political opportunity strcuture will 
be necessary. And since TAC is highly praised for its success in mobilizing hundreds to 
thousands of people, I will examine TAC’s mobilization potential as well as framing 





  I will assess social movement success by examining the Treatment Action 
Campaign, an advocacy organization in South Africa. The very name of this organization 
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often perplexes the observer. If the Treatment Action Campaign is a non-profit non-
governmental organization, why do they call themselves the Treatment Action 
Campaign? The term “campaign” signifies a far different meaning than would a name 
such as the Treatment Action Organization. Although TAC’s name incorporates the term 
campaign rather than organization, it is nevertheless a non-governmental organization, 
meaning that it operates separate from the government. TAC does not accept government 
funding in an effort to maintain its independence.  
In order to study social movement success, we must clarify what social 
movements are. For our purposes, social movements are collective challenges identified 
by a group with a shared purpose and social solidarity, engaged in the effort of sustained 
interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities (Tarrow 1998).  They mount claims 
against their opponents after identifying common or overlapping interests and values. 
However, in order to launch a social movement they must be able to maintain their 
challenge. Social movement scholar, Della Porta (2006) notes social movements are 
fluid, adjusting to the political and social contexts from which they emerge.   
 Organizations that function within social movements can be referred to as 
“professional” social movement organizations (SMO). In some cases, a single 
organization will drive a movement (Della Porta 2006). These organizations are more 
rigid and hierarchical in structure and usually exert a higher degree of social control over 
their members. We will find that the Treatment Action Campaign functions as a lead 
social movement organization.  
Although the Treatment Action Campaign is a social movement organization, 
they include campaign in their organization title. A campaign is defined as a collection of 
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strategically connected activities which are explicitly organized by a group of network 
members in pursuit of a common goal and usually against a specific target (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998, 6). In a campaign, the core network actors are able to create a common 
frame of meaning which is then used to mobilize people and organizations. This process 
occurs as the network actors negotiate within and among the groups in the network and 
connect the groups to each other. They also seek out resources such as information, 
leadership, and symbolic or material capital while also proposing activities and 
conducting public relations (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 7). Activists identify problems, 
specifying the cause of such problems, and then propose solutions. Here, the activists 
keep in mind that their goal is to not only solve the issue but also seek to produce 
procedural, normative, and substantive change in the broader area of concern (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998, 8). In this study, a number of TAC’s campaigns will be examined.  
 
How to Measure Success 
The goal of this study is to create a framework to analyze social movement 
organizations and apply it to the case of TAC. Using the success framework I will 
determine whether or not TAC is a successful social movement organization. Therefore, 
it is first necessary to identify the key variables of this study, as well as how they will be 
measured.  
 The assessment of TAC’s success will be based on examination of the 
independent variables and dependent variables. Here the independent variables are the 
factors influencing success: mobilization potential, external political opportunity 
structure, and framing and social context of the issues (See Figure 1). The dependent 
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variable is success which will be measured through the examination of political and 
cultural/social outcomes. (See Figure 2).  
In this study, the independent variables are the factors that influence the success 
of the SMO. Before attempting to evaluate the success of TAC, I will explore the 
independent variables by looking at three dynamics that influence success. These include: 
 
Figure 1. The Independent Variable 
 
(1) the mobilization potential of the SMO, (2) the external political opportunity structure 
in which the SMO operates, and (3) the framing and social context of the issues the SMO 
tackles. I recognize that these variables are often intermingled and compliment one 
another. For example, mobilization potential and political opportunity structure often go 
hand in hand. However, for my purposes of identifying the factors that influence success 
I will separate these variables and examine them separately.  
For the specific case of the Treatment Action Campaign, I will examine the first 
independent variable, mobilization potential of the SMO, the exploration of TAC’s 
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generated by the involvement of high profile players, skilled professionals, and members 
of the local community who fill staff and volunteers roles within the organization. 
External resources include financial funding, facilities, and material goods. Other 
elements that contribute to the mobilization potential include the SMO’s collaboration 
and connection to the media, other civil society organizations, international affiliates and 
financial donors. These internal and external resources shape the mobilization potential of 
the SMO, which then influences the success of the social movement. In order to grasp the 
size of TAC’s mobilization potential I will look at the human capital of the organization 
and its network of donors and other civil society organizations.  
I will explore the second independent variable, political opportunity structure, by 
examining the creation of the post-apartheid Constitution and how this new Constitution 
provides an enabling environment in which TAC can make claims on issues surrounding 
HIV/AIDS. Other components of the political structure include the operation of the Court 
system and whether or not it allows the SMO to take legal action against the government. 
In conjunction with the examination of the South African Constitution and court system, I 
will discuss the atmosphere of post-apartheid civil society which provided the momentum 
for the creation of TAC as a leading social movement organization. 
The third independent variable to be explored is the framing of issues within the 
society. The framing of issues is vital to the organization’s ability not only to gain 
members but also to give the community at large insight into why the issues proposed by 
the social movement are important and how the issues should be confronted. The social 
context can determine what issues the organization chooses to take up. Therefore, I will 
look at public perceptions of the severity of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the issues 
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related to it using data from public opinion surveys known as the Afrobarometer. I will 
also explore the presence of counter-messages such as AIDS denialism, supported by 
former President Thabo Mbeki, the Health Minister, and traditional healers, and how that 
has played a role in framing issues with the social movement. 
 Now I am ready to begin assessment of the dependent variable of success (refer 
to Figure 2). Since the impact of social movements is multidimensional, success will be 
conceptualized as a function of two outcomes: (1) political outcome, (2) cultural/social 
outcome. Political outcome is the change in the government or legislative level which 
includes changes or creation of government policies. Cultural/social outcomes, which can 
also be referred to as social outcomes, are the changes in social norms, beliefs, and 
behaviors.  I contend that a positive outcome in both areas is necessary for the success of 
a SMO, because each outcome has a domino effect on the next outcome. For example, a 
positive political outcome will allow for a positive cultural/social outcome. Positive 
achievement in both outcomes is necessary for success of the SMO.  A positive political 
outcome must translate into a positive social/cultural outcome for the SMO to be consider 
successful. In the end, a positive political and social/cultural outcome will constitute 




Figure 2. The Dependent Variable 
  
 
The political outcome of the Treatment Action Campaign will be measured by 
counting the number of policies changed or created, whether the goals within policies are 
met, and the number of victories in cases in which TAC takes the South African 
government or international pharmaceutical companies to court. It will be concluded that 
the political outcome is positive if the organization is successful in creating or changing 
policies in accordance with their targeted goals. Certainly, winning court cases in favor of 
TAC’s position will constitute a positive outcome. However, the inability to successfully 
alter policy or government denial of the creation of policy will be considered as a 
negative political outcome, as well as losing court cases. TAC’s involvement in the 
creation of the National Strategic Plan on HIV/AIDS and the SMO’s pressure on the 
government for the creation of a policy on the prevention of mother to child transmission 
of HIV will be closely examined. TAC is known to exert pressure on the government and 
has even sued the government and taken it to court for failure to comply with national 
policies and legislation. The results of pivotal cases such as Minister of Health v. TAC 
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But, TAC’s court involvement is not limited to targeting the government. TAC’s 
struggle to increase access to treatment has led it to target pharmaceutical companies as 
well. Hence, I will examine the results of the case TAC v. MSD and Merck. A court 
ruling in favor of TAC’s position will be considered to be a positive outcome as opposed 
to a court ruling in favor of the pharmaceutical companies being considered as a negative 
outcome. Therefore, the change and creation of policy in addition to winning court cases 
will add up to a positive political outcome, leading the organization in the direction of 
success.  
The second outcome to be examined to determine if the Treatment Action 
Campaign is successful is the cultural and social outcome. Cultural outcomes can occur 
in shifting belief systems and practices. As I examine the role of AIDS denialism by both 
the former Health Minister and the former President, I will explore whether or not TAC 
has exerted a positive influence to counter-act and reduce AIDS denialism. Also, the use 
of traditional healers and cures will be examined. For example, the case of Matthias Rath, 
a self-proclaimed traditional healer who provides vitamins as AIDS cures, will be 
studied. I will examine how the TAC has tackled the case of Rath’s so-called AIDS cure 
and how this has or has not altered cultural beliefs about the disease and its treatment. 
The cultural outcome of TAC’s efforts will be determined by whether or not TAC has 
influenced society enough to lead the public to deny Rath’s claims. This will be assessed 
through data from newspapers’ documentation of public opinion. If TAC’s effort reduces 
AIDS denialism, it will be counted as positive. Also, decreased stigma of HIV positive 
status as well as greater understanding and adherence to treatment will contribute to a 
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positive social outcome. This is to be assessed through analysis of the efforts in TAC’s 
Cool Youth and Treatment Literacy campaigns at the grassroots level.  
For the Treatment Action Campaign to be a successful social movement 
organization, it must be found that it has achieved a positive political outcome and 
positive cultural/social outcome. The mobilization potential will affect the political 
outcome. If positive outcomes are accomplished, I will deem TAC successful.  
A case study of the Treatment Action Campaign of South Africa will be valuable 
for several reasons. The HIV/AIDS crisis across the sub-Saharan region affects two-
thirds of all people suffering with AIDS globally. According to UNAIDS, South Africa 
has the largest HIV epidemic in the world. In the depths of this epidemic, the Treatment 
Action Campaign has emerged with the goal of increasing access to treatment for those 
living with HIV/AIDS. TAC has served as a model social movement for groups in other 
countries on the continent also experiencing the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Observers often 
ponder why they are not able to mobilize and launch a movement like that of the 
Treatment Action Campaign.  
 Not only has the Treatment Action Campaign been recognized nationally and 
within the region, it has also been in the international spotlight. In addition to its Nobel 
nomination, TAC has also been featured in the New York Times on several occasions as 
well as in Time Europe, where journalist Peter Hawthorne referred to TAC as the 
“country's leading AIDS activist movement.” Other international organizations such as 
OXFAM and the Ford Foundation have supported and funded TAC in their efforts in the 
fight against the epidemic.    
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 Certainly, TAC’s international, regional and domestic popularity as well as 
publicity have increased over the past decade. But is TAC truly as successful as it is 
perceived to be? This study seeks to analyze the true success of TAC by engaging social 
movement theory.  
 
Organizational Structure of TAC 
 In order to do so, we must explore the organization on multiple levels. TAC 
operates as four levels – national, provincial, district and branch levels. The National 
Office, located in Cape Town, is the political arm of the organization. Staff and 
volunteers often deal with representatives of government and seek to influence health 
policies while also drawing attention to government noncompliance with its own 
legislation.  
 TAC has six provincial offices in nine of South Africa’s provinces. I will focus on 
the Western Cape Provincial office in order to see how it manages the multiple district 
offices within the province. The Western Cape Provincial office, where I was able to 
work for four weeks in January and February 2008, is mainly responsible for 
administrative tasks and organization of district-level activities, including thousands of 
community members in order to protest for various causes.  
Next are the district offices. The Khayelitsha District office in Site B is the largest 
district in TAC and serves as the model district. I will examine the Khayelitsha district 
office and the multiple campaigns run through this office. The district offices are 
primarily the ones responsible for the branches within their district. The Khayelitsha 
district office manages 14 branches within the area, which together mobilize existing 
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members and recruit new members. The district and branch levels are the social arms of 




 The case study of the Treatment Action Campaign will be developed through data 
gathered from multiple primary and secondary sources. My trip to South Africa (through 
the UConn Honors in Cape Town program in 2008) allowed me to carry out participant 
observation of the inner workings of the Treatment Action Campaign in Cape Town. 
Observations of the organization were collected from January to April 2008, during 
which time I served as an intern in several TAC offices. I began in TAC’s Western Cape 
Provincial Office working for 21 hours per week, from January to February 2008. Most 
of this time was spent preparing for TAC’s Western Cape Provincial Congress, attended 
by TAC delegates from 14 branches within the Western Cape along with staff and 
volunteers from the TAC National Office. In preparation for the Congress, I worked 
under the supervision of the Western Cape Coordinator Fredalene Booysen. My 
responsibilities included database management of over 1000 TAC members and 
volunteers; drafting letters and invitations for the Congress; and preparing packets to be 
distributed at the Congress. 
After attending the Western Cape Provincial Congress from February 8-10, 2008, I 
transferred to the Khayelitsha District office, where I interned for 24 hours per week for a 
period of 10 weeks. During this time I was given administrative duties as the interim 
Administrator of the office, often dealing with the finances of the office as well as re-
organizing TAC archives and records of the organization’s various campaigns. I 
participated in weekly staff meetings and worked closely with staff members as well as 
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volunteers within the Khayelitsha office. I also attended court cases in the Khayelitsha 
Magistrate Court and the Cape Town High Court and also protested and marched 
alongside TAC members for various causes within the HIV/AIDS community. I attended 
branch meetings within the Khayelitsha District and other events connected with their 
various campaigns for youth and treatment literacy.  
 Though my experience with TAC is not limited to what has been described above, 
it afforded me the opportunity gather data through participant observation. I will 
supplement this with archival data from the organization as well as internal documents 
and publications such as TAC’s Congressional Reports and Equal Treatment, TAC’s 
magazine publication. In addition, other primary source data will include South African 
government policies outlined in the National Strategic Plan on HIV/AIDS and 
documentation from relevant court cases available through the South African 
Government website. In addition, I will use statistical data from the United Nation 
available through UNAIDS and the World Health Organization (WHO).  
 Additionally, I will use secondary sources such as scholarly articles and books 
both to deepen my assessment of TAC and to assess the campaign in relation to broader 
social movement theory. The work of key authors in social movement literature, such as 
Tilly and Tarrow (2007), McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996), Giugni (2004) and others 
will be closely examined. Articles from scholarly journals such as Social Policy and 
Politics & Society have analyzed the Treatment Action Campaign. Several books will be 
utilized to further assess TAC’s activities and the political arena in which TAC operates, 
such as Alex de Waal’s AIDS and Power: Why There is No Political Crisis - Yet (2006) 
and Pieter Fourie’s The Political Management of HIV and AIDS in South Africa (2006).   
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 This combination of sources will provide me with ample data for answering the 
central question at stake: whether or not the “success” of the Treatment Action Campaign 
is a fitting reality or an inaccurate impression.  
 
History and Establishment of the Treatment Action Campaign 
The Constitution of South African is known to be one of the most progressive in the 
world. It includes many of the core human rights central to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, including a range of economic rights.  
 The Treatment Action Campaign was founded as the next major threat emerged in 
the post-apartheid era: the HIV/AIDS epidemic. This epidemic menaces the progression 
of the reconstruction and development of the new South Africa, not only impeding the 
evolution of economic and political transformation, but also social and cultural growth. 
 TAC was founded on International Human Rights Day, the 10th of December, 
1998. The emergence of a ‘rights based’, ‘patient-driven’ civil society organization was 
the result of a fusion of the gay-rights movement during and post-apartheid. The gay-
rights movement and newly declared Constitution of South Africa allowed for the 
germination of such an organization to sprout on firm ground.   
 During the 1990s the stage was set for the formation of the Treatment Action 
Campaign. The distinct democratic culture of the post-apartheid government gave way 
for civil society to test its right to freedom of speech, right of assembly and right to 
information. Even more, the culture of rights provided a language which would be 
significantly utilized by TAC in order to push towards greater access to HIV treatment. 
By identifying the potential power of human rights, TAC comrades created an enabling 
environment in which to birth a new social movement and fight for socio-economic 
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justice through equal treatment for HIV. In order to provide an explanation of the 
political environment in which TAC arose, it is necessary to dive into the history that led 
to its establishment.  
 It was not until 1982 that AIDS had surfaced in South Africa. Into the mid-1980s 
it was estimated that somewhere between 10 and 15 percent of gay men in Johannesburg 
were infected with HIV. Soon thereafter, the gay rights movement quickly added 
HIV/AIDS activism to its agenda. Gay rights activists such as Zackie Achmat and Edwin 
Cameron, persons who will be further elaborated upon later, were great contributors to 
the formation of the Treatment Action Campaign, in addition to the influences of other 
groups and people. One notable influence on TAC was the AIDS Coalition to Unleash 
Power, also known as ACT UP, established in the United States in the 1980s. This radical 
group targeted pharmaceutical companies and AIDS researchers as well as to the US 
government for inadequate attempts to develop an effective HIV Treatment within the 
first decade of the epidemic. ACT UP was known for its loud presence, staged ‘lie-ins’ 
(as opposed to “sit-ins”) and powerful political slogans, all tactics that have influenced 
TAC’s activism strategies.  
Another significant catalyst to the formation of the TAC was the life and death of 
ANC leader and gay-rights/AIDS activist Simon Nkoli. This led Achmat to vow to drive 
forward “Nkoli’s struggle for openness and the protection of the rights of people living 
with HIV, especially their right to treatment access” (Mbali 2005, 10). Achmat wrote in a 
letter to HIV/AIDS activists in 1998 following Nkoli’s death,  
“On Friday night at Simon’s funeral I made a call for ten people with HIV/AIDS, 
their families and friends and allies to start a symbolic fast for access to treatment 
on 10 December 1998… Openness and treatment are two pivotal issues...A 
campaign for ‘Openness’ is in reality a call for activism and the assertion of 
identity. People with HIV/AIDS are on our own (whether in or out of the closet) 
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– while we should seek love, compassion and care – we should also demand 
treatment.” 
 
This call for the creation of the TAC was a call for a movement led by HIV positive 
activists who are open about their status. Since then, openness about HIV status has been 
a pivotal benchmark of the organization’s political and social strategy. Achmat’s call was 
met with a mix of thousands of both HIV positive and HIV negative activists wearing t-
shirts boldly displaying the image ‘HIV POSITIVE.’ This strategy of openness 
transformed the HIV epidemic from one that was silent and invisible to one that is 
politically loud and vocal with a large visible constituency, which provides leverage to 
the equal treatment movement led by the TAC. The promotion of openness proved to be a 
powerful political tool.  
Whereas in the early 1990s, human rights-focused AIDS activists were directing 
their efforts to sustain greater respect for the right to patient confidentiality, in the late 
1990s human rights-focused AIDS activists utilized openness and HIV status as a way to 
demand greater respect for the socio-economic right to access to health care.  This led to 
so-called “patient-activism”, driven by people living with HIV/AIDS. This is an attribute 
of the TAC which is widely reflected within the organization to this day. Furthermore, 
HIV/AIDS discussions were no longer held in the third person, as if speaking of an 
abstracted third party, but now taken place in the first person, giving a human face to the 
epidemic. 
 In addition to the creation of an atmosphere of openness, the political arena in the 
post-apartheid nature fostered an environment in which an organization such as TAC 
could be created. The emergence of TAC was influenced significantly by two historical 
developments post 1994: the development of antiretroviral drug therapy, and the adoption 
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of the new South African Constitution, which specifically outlined socio-economic rights. 
Mobilization was crucial for the former due to two blockages in access to HIV treatment. 
The first was the protection of patent monopolies, utilized by the pharmaceutical 
industry’s, and the second was AIDS denialism within the government. Several key 
government officials, such as President Mbeki and the Health Minister, rejected the 
efficacy and safety of HIV treatment due to their AIDS denialist ideologies. Needless to 
say, this had resoundingly negative consequences on the HIV/AIDS community.  
 Before concluding the history and establishment overview, several other notable 
persons must be mentioned. As noted earlier, the death of Simon Nkoli spurred Achmat 
to carry out Nkoli’s struggle for openness and access to treatment. But near this time, 
Gugu Dlamini, a 36 year old woman, openly pronounced her HIV positive status on the 
radio at a World AIDS Day ceremony. Three short weeks later, Gugu was murdered by 
men in her community because of her HIV positive status. In remembrance of her life and 
protest against her needless death, 100 shirts were printed with the logo ‘HIV 
POSITIVE.’ Hence, “TAC’s struggle for social justice and the rights of people with HIV 
and AIDS had begun” (TAC Diary, 2008).  
 Since the formation of the TAC, numerous campaigns and court cases have 
generated vast media publicity. This has allowed for greater awareness surrounding 
HIV/AIDS rights and discrimination as well as mobilizing greater numbers within civil 
society. TAC has battled the South African Government and international pharmaceutical 
companies in order to press forward for equal treatment for all people. And as TAC 
prepares for the future, its members continue to strive for health equality, while 




ANALYSIS OF TAC SUCCESS  
  
 Analysis of TAC’s success will be assessed in two steps. First, I will thoroughly 
examine all the independent variables and its multiple components. Then, I will examine 
the dependent variable, success, by measuring positive political, cultural, and social 






Now I am ready to assess TAC’s success by first examining the independent 
variables of political opportunity structure which involves components including the 
Court system and the Constitution among others. 
 
Political Opportunity Structure 
Anti-apartheid struggle and post-apartheid civil society 
 From 1945 to the late 1980s, the majority of South Africans experienced 
displacement, deprivation and discrimination to the fullest extent through the apartheid 
policies set in place by the National Party. Segregation and racial discrimination were 
codified in law, which led to the dislocation of black and “colored” South Africans into 
homelands or Bantustans, the outskirts of urban areas. To this day, millions of black and 
colored South Africans reside in the townships that were created as a result of apartheid, 
many of which are still without electricity or running water.  
 The legalization of racial discrimination led to the deprivation of citizenship for 
all but the small white minority. This resulted in poverty and diease among the displaced 
black and colored population. The race ideology of black inferiority was repeatedly 
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confirmed through law and practice, resulting in segregation realities that ravaged the 
quality of living in every way possible for black and colored people (London 2004, 8). 
The segregation policies were implemented to the fullest extent possible, especially in the 
quality of health care afforded to each group.  
 Dislocation and segregation plunged the black and colored communities into 
extreme poverty. Poverty then manifested itself in violence and disease throughout their 
communities. During the dismantling of apartheid, which began in the 1980s, health 
became a large concern to anti-apartheid activists.  
 The end of apartheid was largely achieved by the anti-apartheid movement.  The 
anti-apartheid struggle was fought through utilization of the courts and the media, in 
addition to local and transnational advocacy networks, along with grassroots mobilization 
and skillful negotiations (Robins and von Lieres 2004, 582). Activism within this time 
period gave TAC a greater political understanding of fighting oppression and creating a 
movement. TAC situated itself within anti-apartheid politics, a result of the experience of 
TAC’s founding leadership, “who cut their activist teeth during the anti-apartheid 
struggles of the 1980s” (ibid). The anti-apartheid struggle provided the political 
opportunity for the formulation and growth of TAC.   
 It was also during this time that the movement to realize the right to health as a 
human right began, immediately following the death of Steve Biko. In 1977 Biko, a 
political activist, was detained and tortured to death. Apolitical health professionals found 
the complicity of Biko’s medical doctors to be unethical and deeply offensive. In an 
effort to address this injustice, these health professionals signed petitions, wrote letters, 
marched holding placards, and even joined organizations that would spur change. 
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 In addition to Biko’s death and the dismantling of apartheid’s segregationist 
policies, the post-apartheid reality of the socioeconomic status of black and colored South 
Africans continued to have its racial divide. Black and colored South Africans still 
experience higher prevalence of disease and mortality in contrast to the white minority. It 
was easy to see the crippling ramifications of apartheid policies on those who lived in 
homelands in terms of poor quality of living and health.  Not surprisingly, in the post-
apartheid era TAC and others focused on the right to health, largely in response to the 
devastation of the physical well-being of the majority of the population.  
 The political opportunity was made clear after 1994. With the defeat of the 
apartheid regime, the former opponents were now obliged to implement policies and 
programs advocated for in the anti-apartheid struggle. Thus, the health ministers at the 
national and provincial levels began to implement pro-poor policies in the health and 
social service sectors (London 2004, 8). This, coupled with the human rights discourse 
developed in the anti-apartheid struggle, led to an emerging partnership between civil 
society and the new government in the development and implementation of new health 
policies. TAC took advantage of this political opportunity and made an effort to shape 
public policy for the health and equity of marginalized groups.  
 
South African Constitution and Court System 
 South Africa’s newly adopted post-apartheid Constitution was adopted in 1996 
and is now known to be the most progressive Constitution in the world. Chapter 2 of the 
South African Constitution features a Bill of Rights in which Articles 7 through 39 
specify various civil and political rights in addition to socioeconomic rights. Article 27 
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states, “Everyone has the right to have access to  health care services, including 
reproductive health care; The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these 
rights” (South African Constitution). The inclusion of the socioeconomic right to health 
makes this a very progressive Constitution, thus allowing citizens direct access to make 
claims to such rights as human rights.  
 Even more, the South African Constitution states rights of citizens to have 
remedies for the enforcement of their rights. Article 38 specifies this right stating, 
“Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a 
right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant 
appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights.” This article furthermore elaborates 
that a person can approach the court seeking not only their own interest, but also on 
behalf of the public interest.  Article 34 ensures citizens the right to access the courts. 
This opens the door for TAC to access the courts and make the claims it does. 
 The South African court system is similar to the U.S. court system.  From top to 
bottom the court system is composed of the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of 
Appeals, High Courts of South Africa (ten provincial divisions and three local divisions), 
Circuit Courts, and nine specialized courts. The specialized courts consist of a court on 
taxes, labor, divorce, land claims, a water tribunal, the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC), magistrates, small claims and community courts (Constitutional 
Court of South Africa).  
 A case can go to the Constitutional court through various means, but only two 
methods are relevant for the work of TAC. A case can go to the Constitutional Court 
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“as the result of an appeal from a judgment of the High Court or the Supreme Court of 
Appeal or as a direct application to the Court, asking it to sit as a court of first and last 
instance because of the urgency of the matter”  (CITE Const. Ct website) 
 I will explore a few of TAC’s most pivotal cases , one of which was heard in the 





Internal Resources  
 
 Internal resources of SMOs are human capital, which consists of professional 
staff, high profile players, organization members, and local community members. I will 
examine each of these components as they relate to TAC and contribute to its 
mobilization potential (refer to Figure 1).  
 
Staff and Membership 
 
 Today, TAC has an elaborate management system, composed of a two-tier 
governing body and offices at the national, provincial and district levels (refer to Figure 
1). These offices allow the organization to function at the political level alongside the 
South African government, and also recruit and provide serves at the grassroots level. 
TAC’s many campaigns, events, and activities are all made possible through the 
coordinated efforts of paid staff and volunteers.  
However, the present-day management system of the organization and the sheer 
number of staff and volunteers that allow for the operation of TAC did not exist a decade 
ago. In 2000, just two years after the birth of TAC, the organization’s staff consisted of 
three individuals and 800 members. Four years later, in 2004, TAC’s paid staff grew to 
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46. Then in 2006, the organization’s staff expanded to 67 and an estimated 16,000 
members. Within the same year, TAC also attracted 350 interns (CITE).   
TAC’s founders, South African native Zackie Achmat and Mark Heywood, 
originally from London, continue to play a large role within the organization even ten 
years after it was established. Achmat and Heywood are currently placed among the top 
positions within the organization. Achmat and Heywood serve in the National Executive 
Committee (NEC), the highest authority and decision making body of TAC, respectively 
as chairperson and treasurer. Achmat became the international face of the organization 
early on in the development of TAC (Robins 2004, 663).  Heywood not only plays an 
active role in TAC but has simultaneously been involved with the AIDS Law Project in 
South Africa since 1994 and now serves as the project head. He is also the Deputy Chair 
of the South African National AIDS Council (SANAC). Heywood’s participation in these 
organizations and activism in the anti-apartheid movement since the 1980s makes him a 
knowledgeable and valuable resource to the organization. Both Achmat and Heywood 
have advanced degrees, adding to the professional staff in the organization.  
TAC also has a group of lawyers who have facilitated in numerous court cases, 
some of which will be examined later. These lawyers provide countless hours of service 
on behalf of the organization. TAC attracts the services of lawyers from the Legal 
Resource Centre (LRC), South Africa’s largest public interest law center founded in 
1979. In addition to these legal professionals, many middle-class business and health 
professionals, as well as scientists have volunteered their services for TAC’s initiatives 
(Robin 2004, 665).  
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 Over the years, the increasing number of staff and members is reflected in the 
growth and creation of new districts and branches. TAC now has 10 districts with 49 
active branches. The district offices organize events within the district in addition to 
facilitating meetings at the branch level. The district offices employ paid staff and 
volunteers, whereas the branches are solely composed of unpaid volunteers and local 
community members. The districts and branches create the backbone of the organization 
since they are the predominant recruiting bodied within the organization.  
 Currently, Khayelitsha (which is in the Western Cape Province) is the largest 
district in TAC, with 14 active branches. As the largest growing district within the 
organization, Khayelitsha serves as a model district. The organization strives to develop 
all the other districts to be comparable not just in size but also in terms of the functional 





Since its founding, TAC has increased in its size in staff and membership as well 
as the scope of its campaigns and activities. This is made possible through the increase in 
human resources outlined above, as well as through the significant increase in funding the 
organization has experienced over the years. TAC does not receive any funding from the 
African National Congress, South Africa’s governing political party since apartheid, and 
thus relies heavily on donations.  
At the onset of the organization, TAC’s generated revenue amounted to little over 
R200,000, about US$32,000. In 2004, TAC’s income increased to about R14.5 million, 
about US$1.9 million. At the end of 2008, the organization reported an income of R36.7 
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million, about US$5.1 million (see Appendix A for full budget figures). Most of the 
income was generated through international donations from various organizations and 
individuals. In the fiscal year of 2007-08, the largest donors were the Swedish 
International Development Agency and Atlantic Philanthropies, a U.S. based private 
foundation. Other large donors include Medecins San Fronteieres (MSF or Doctors 
without Borders), OXFAM Australia, and the Royal Netherlands Foundation.  
 The Treatment Action Campaign does not receive any funding from USAID 
because “it is seen to promote the interests of the US Government,” or pharmaceutical 




 In order for the organization to operate, offices were set up for each province and 
district. Only one office exists for the national level, which was recently relocated to 
Cape Town from Muizenberg. Each of the districts within TAC has its own office and set 
of paid staff. TAC’s income allows for each office to be equipped with computers and 
full internet and phone services. Each province and district office is allocated funds for 
paid staff positions and material resources according to the district’s size and functional 
capacity, which is determined by the national office. The largest district, Khayelitsha has 
office space thanks to MSF’s generous offer to provide office space for them across from 




 TAC’s presence within the media is considerable. Due to TAC’s highly 
politicized events such as campaigns, marches, protests and court cases, newspaper 
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consistently showcase these events. The organization tackles so many issues related to 
HIV/AIDS and is entrenched so deeply in the political and social dimensions of the 
disease that TAC is visible in multiple arenas. The set up of the organizational structure 
demonstrates how TAC is able to operate on so many different levels.  
 The organization’s media connections are not limited to newspapers. When 
planning protests, marches or other high profile events, TAC often calls upon local and 
national radio and news stations to cover their event. This is often done through a media 




 From the founding of the organization TAC has utilized networking and 
partnerships as a vital tool to achieve their objectives. Realizing that HIV/AIDS has many 
political and socioeconomic dimensions it was not difficult to cultivate alliances with 
other movements or organizations. In the immediate post-apartheid transition in 1994, 
TAC allied itself with the Trade Union Movement (London 2004, 10).  TAC also 
developed long-standing relationships with the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU), a partner in the Tri-partite Alliance with the African National Congress and 
the South African Communist Party, as well as Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF). 
Positioning itself with COSATU has proven to be critical for TAC’s political 
engagements.  Although, it is unknown whether if this was intentional, the Western Cape 
Provincial office is in Salt River, Cape Town, with their office sharing the floor of a 
building with COSATU.  
 




 My study focuses on the decade of 1998-2008, the first decade of the Treatment 
Action Campaign takes place during a pivotal time in South African history. The birth of 
TAC took place in the post-apartheid era in which new rights were asserted during a time 
of economic redistribution. The early 1990s also mark the onset of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. Being aware of the social context in which TAC arose will allow for 
examination of TAC’s strategic framing. I will examine how TAC maneuvered the 
political environment and social context of AIDS to strategically create frames in which 
to work. This exploration will show interplay between political opportunity, mobilization, 
and framing as well as a dynamic interchange between TAC’s frames and other counter 
frames. The process is an interactive dialogue where one side presents an argument and 
the other a counter argument.  
 Given the social and political context of South African history, we will see three 
main time periods in which TAC implemented different frames. First, I will look at the 
period of 1998 to 2000, the early years of setting the rights debate; second, the period of 
2000 to 2003, the rise of the AIDS denialism and pseudoscience; and lastly, the period of 
2003-2008, when TAC seeks to see government action and treatment roll-out.  
 As noted by Zald, cultural context and historical events provide opportunities for 
framing (1996, 261). In this case, the struggle out of apartheid and the formation of the 
post-apartheid South African Constitution set the framework for people to assert their 
rights. The new Constitution, not only gave HIV-positive people the authority to claim 
their right to health but to equal citizenship and access to treatment. It was during this 
time that TAC framed their initiatives in terms of claiming their rights and therefore 
obliging the government to provide life saving medications for HIV-positive people 
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(Vandormael 2007, 226). TAC created the movement as an assertion to their right to 
treatment, pressing the government for more affordable drug treatments and policies to 
implement a nation-wide treatment plan.  
 Initially TAC gained momentum in their mobilization capacity and exercising 
their demands against the government. But in 2000, President Thabo Mbeki began to 
outwardly support AIDS dissident science, speaking out against the intellectual 
foundations of AIDS health science and policy (Butler 2005, 594). It was during this time 
that Mbeki discredited AIDS science, denying the causal link between HIV and AIDS 
and positing that antiretrovirals (ARVs) may be poisonous and lethal. Facing public 
critics, such as academics, opposition parties, AIDS activists, and health professionals 
who all spoke out against dissident AIDS science, Mbeki created his own AIDS advisory 
panel. Mbeki established the President’s Select Advisory Panel of AIDS Experts (see 
Figure 3), composed of ‘established scientists’ and AIDS dissidents (Robins 2004, 658).  
With the rise of AIDS dissident science, the use of traditional healers and 
medicine became an increasing norm amongst the South African community. With 
dissident science being supported by the President, existing myths about AIDS gained 
momentum as well. Common myths about AIDS included that it was the product of 
witch-craft, a punishment from God, a disease created by the United States, CIA to 
deplete the African population or created by drug companies to create drug markets. Even 
more, some believed that lubricants in condoms were the source of HIV, sex with infants 
of virgins would cure AIDS or ARVs were toxic. Alongside this plethora of myths and 
conspiracy theories stood President Mbeki flirting with dissident science, creating a 
government of policy makers and politicians that sustained AIDS denialism.  
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The government support of AIDS denialism was also shared with some traditional 
healers. One traditional healer, Matthias Rath, a German national, received much 
attention from TAC for his distribution of vitamins as an AIDS cure and clinical trials on 
HIV-positive individuals, eventually leading to the death of two clinical trial participants.  
Matthias Rath, a self-proclaimed traditional healer, is not alone in developing 
concoctions as AIDS cures and treatments. Others in township areas of the Cape Flats 
have advertised their home-grown herb supplements and drink mixtures that would cure 
the symptoms of AIDS. These traditional healers related to the link between body and 
spirit, targeting that as the source of AIDS.  
 




 With AIDS dissident science within the government, the spread of AIDS-related 
myths and conspiracy theories and practice of traditional healers, conventional science 
regarding AIDS was severely undermined. Therefore, TAC sought to counter these 
frames with another intellectual frame. This was done through a strategic approach in 
which TAC created an intellectual campaign in the early 2000s, relying on the expert and 
professional training for TAC members.  More on this will be discussed later.  
 Initially, TAC used a rights claiming frame in response to the political 
opportunity created by the post-apartheid Constitution. Mobilization was possible given 
the continued strength of the post-apartheid civil society. Then TAC shifted its frame 
from a rights discourse to an intellectual campaign as a counter argument to AIDS 
dissident science. In later years, the mid to late 2000s, TAC had to re-focus itself after 
victories in cases against the government and pharmaceutical companies. TAC re-framed 
its strategy to largely focus on pressing the government for implementation of policies 
and treatment plans they had promised.  
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: MEASURING SUCCESS 
  
 Now that I have examined the independent variables that affect success, I am 
ready to assess the success of TAC by examining political and cultural/social outcomes. 
Examining each outcome requires determining whether or not the outcome is positive as 
mentioned previously. Positive outcomes will contribute to success.    
 The strategies used by the Treatment Action Campaign will now be examined to 
assess whether this social movement organization has achieved success. This will be 
done by examining the dependent variable, success, as a composite of two parts: the 
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political outcome and social outcome of TAC’s activities (refer to Figure 2). The first 
part to be measured is its political outcome, which has four indicators: 1) the number of 
legal cases won by TAC; 2) the creation of new public policy on HIV/AIDS; 3) the 
reform of existing policy; and finally 4) the implementation of new and existing policies 
overall. Then the social outcome will be measured, also with four indicators, as follows: 
1) TAC’s strategies in countering AIDS denialism; 2) the creation of policies to counter 
the work of traditional healers; 3) the increase of treatment adherence; and 4) the overall 
decrease of HIV/AIDS stigma and misperceptions.  
 
Political Outcome 
Firstly, I will examine what TAC has achieved given the political structure 
developed throughout the anti-apartheid era, specifically by examining TAC’s strategies 
within the democratization process of South Africa. This exploration will focus on TAC’s 
use of the new South African Constitution and court system in which new rights were 
asserted. Then I will look at the effects of TAC’s political victories have had on the social 
dimension, by examining TAC’s strategies at the local and grassroots levels which 
allowed for the overturning of AIDS denialism and greater education surrounding the 
disease.  
 Success will be determined by reviewing TAC’s strategies and victories over 
time. Political outcomes will be measured by assessing whether or not TAC achieved a 
positive or negative outcome in terms of the goals it pursued. A positive outcome is one 
in which TAC’s specific goal was achieved whereas a negative outcome is one where 
TAC’s goal was not achieved. For example, did TAC win the court cases it brought to the 
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High Court or Constitutional Court of South Africa? Did TAC successfully press the 
South African government to put HIV/AIDS and treatment access on the political agenda 
through the creation of specific public policies? And now, is TAC successfully pushing 
the government to implement the policies to the fullest extent possible. In the pursuit of 
each of these goals, I will show how TAC’s advocacy draw on historic repertoires of 
contention honed in during the anti-apartheid struggle.  
 
Striving for Treatment Access and Policy Creation (1998 to 2003) 
 From 1998, when TAC was first founded, to 2003 the organization heavily 
focused on campaigning for wider access to HIV/AIDS treatment. TAC created this goal 
because the organization identified the dangers presented by the rejection of the safety 
and efficacy of HIV treatments promoted by dissident scientists (Mbali 2005, 19). 
Consequently, TAC sought to battle the South African government and multinational 
pharmaceutical companies to provide greater access to HIV drugs for people.  
 By the end of 1998, TAC had already initiated a campaign for the Prevention of 
Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV (PMTCT). In this campaign TAC demanded that 
the government provide access to azathioprine (AZT), a drug that would help prevent 
HIV-positive pregnant women from transmitting the virus to their unborn children. Some 
government members argued that the drug was too costly while others outwardly denied 
the effectiveness of the drug. The Minister of Health would not allow for a program on 
PMTCT or dispersal of the drug due to skepticism redarding the efficacy of the drug 
(Minister of Health v TAC, 2002).  Meanwhile, President Thabo Mbeki outwardly 
proclaimed that AZT was poisonous and life-threatening, not live-saving. For the next 
five years, TAC demonstrated and marched throughout South Africa in protest of the 
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government and pharmaceutical companies. The case was later presented to the Court in 
2002, which will be explored in further detail. 
 As previously discussed, the anti-apartheid struggle presented new forms of civil 
society action. Echoing the anti-dompas (pass law) defiance campaigns of the apartheid 
era, TAC created the “Christopher Moraka Defiance Campaign against Patent Abuse” in 
2000 (Robins 2004). This civil disobedience campaign aimed to uncover the excessive 
profiteering on patented drugs by illegally importing generic drugs from Thailand.  
 The campaign was named after a TAC volunteer Christopher Moraka who has 
died in July 2000 from AIDS-related oral thrush. TAC’s spokespersons claimed that 
fluconazole, a drug not available to the public health system due to its exorbitant costs, 
would have eased his suffering and pain. TAC publicly announced its intentions to defy 
pharmaceutical patents on drugs at a conference in July 2000, while also calling upon 
other organizations and individuals to join their campaign. This immediately brought 
immense international attention, intensifying the outcry against pharmaceutical giant 
Pfizer. After Achmat purchased 5,000 capsules of fluconazole in Thailand, TAC exposed 
the profiteering and patent abuse by Pfizer. A 200mg capsule of fluconazole cost R28.57 
in the South African public sector and an astonishing R80.24 in the private sector, 
whereas in Thailand one capsule cost R1.78. It became clear that Pfizer had inflated 
prizes of name-brand medications. This critical identification of pricing differences, in 
addition to Pfizer’s unwillingness to reveal their investment and pricing policies, left 




 Not long after in March 2001, Pfizer finally lowered drug prices. The public 
pressure built up through TAC’s protests in the form of fasts and rallies throughout Cape 
Town and Durban, forced the company to reduce the prizes of their products (Thomas 
and Dorono 2004). In state clinics, Pfizer made its drugs available free of charge. This 
put TAC on the international forefront with their “David and the Goliath” victory against 
a pharmaceutical giant, catapulting the organization into the global arena (Robins 2004). 
This victory can obviously be counted as a positive political outcome for TAC.  
 Though TAC experienced a huge victory against Pfizer, the battle against 
pharmaceutical giants was not over. While TAC was also confronting the South African 
government in its PMTCT campaign, it was working alongside the government in a court 
case initiated by pharmaceutical companies. In March 2001, thirty-nine pharmaceutical 
companies, represented through the Pharmaceuticals Manufacturing Association of South 
Africa (PMA), brought the South African government to court (OXFAM Policy Report, 
April 2001). The PMA claimed that certain amendments to the 1997 Medicines and 
Related Substances Act were unconstitutional. The proposed amendments would enable 
the government to make drugs more affordable in South Africa by decreasing the prices 
of the PMA’s drugs (TAC Diary 2008). The law allowed less expensive generic drugs to 
be imported or made in South Africa.  Though TAC was not initially involved in the case, 
TAC incorporated itself into the court case as a “friend of the court,” or amicus curiae, to 
provide evidence relevant to the government’s argument. Here is an example of how 
TAC balanced its tactics of conflict and co-operation in its relationship with the 
government. In this case, TAC actually acted as an ally to the government rather than 
acting in opposition of it.   
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 This was a political opportunity that allowed TAC to insert itself not simply 
because the government’s goal mirrored TAC’s, but also to demonstrate that TAC is 
willing to work with the government. Whereas, in the PMTCT campaign the organization 
was mainly battling the government, this case presented an opportunity for TAC to work 
cooperatively with the government. In many situations we will see that TAC launches 
action as a challenger of the government, thus creating a relationship of conflict.  
However in the legal case with the PMA, TAC leaders immediately saw the opportunity 
to show that its goal is not to create hostility with government, but to win greater access 
to treatment. In the long run this was a conscientious strategic maneuver to dispel beliefs 
that the organization was an enemy to the newly formed democratic government.   
 
Figure 4. Zapiro cartoon featured in The Mail & Guardian on March 6, 2001. 
 
 
 Throughout the involvement of this case, a legal battle which actually began in 
1998, the organization assembled and participated in numerous protests and 
demonstrations. Between December 1998 and February 2001, TAC organized seven 
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public demonstrations in the form of protests and marches (TAC Newsletter March 
2001). During this period, TAC’s “Global March for Access to HIV/AIDS Treatment” in 
July 2000, involved more than 6000 people. While members, volunteers, and 
sympathizers of TAC congregated in protests and marches, its leaders were hard at work. 
TAC representatives met with government policy makers and the PMA nine times before 
the case was concluded.  
 In April 2001, the PMA conceded to the numerous national and international 
pressures to withdraw its case against the South African government. This was mainly the 
result of negative media publicity against the pharmaceutical companies involved such as 
Pfizer and Glaxo Wellcome for drug profiteering (Robins and von Lieres 2004). Since 
TAC’s marches and protests occurred all over the country, it received much media 
attention as well, both domestically and internationally. This also helped cast a negative 
light on the pharmaceutical companies and won international sympathy for South Africa 
and TAC’s claim against the PMA.  
 Overall, TAC’s involvement in the PMA case was crucial to the government’s 
success against the international pharmaceutical industry.  Mobilization and collective 
action brought international and national attention to the issue, which then shamed the 
pharmaceutical companies into withdrawing the case. While thousands gathered for 
public protests in South Africa, TAC also implemented a highly successful global media 
campaign, convincing international public opinion that pharmaceutical companies had a 
moral obligation to make drugs affordable (Robins 2004). If the numerous protests and 
marches and international media campaign had not occurred, the pharmaceutical 
companies may not have wanted to retract the case. This ending can be counted as 
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another positive outcome. TAC’s goal was to further government efforts to make drugs 
more affordable to South Africans. Dismissal of the PMA case opened the stage for the 
implementation of the legal framework created through the Medicines Act to be finalized, 
thus allowing for cheap and effective drugs to reach the people. Finally, South Africa was 
able to have more affordable drugs and manufacture generics within the country.   
 Though a long and protracted court case with the PMA was avoided, TAC’s break 
from the courts amounted to only a brief intermission. In 2001, after years of government 
lethargy and disregard for the creation of a national PMTCT program, TAC took 
advantage of a political opportunity to take the Minister of Health to court. The case of 
the Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (2002) arose out of years of 
struggle to pressure the government to implement a PMTCT program but more 
specifically in response to discriminatory legislation created by the South African 
government. In August 2001, a government policy was made outlining the distribution of 
the drug Nevirapine (NVP) in public health institutions. This drug helps to prevent 
mother-to-child HIV transmission at birth. A few pharmaceutical companies had offered 
Nevirapine to South Africa at no cost for a period of five years. However, the 
government did not allow for wide disbursement of this drug, claiming that it must be 
subject to tests and research before being distributed to the public. The government did 
allow the drug to be made available in two sites, but not to the public at large. TAC 
challenged this policy since the Medicine Control Council, a specialist body responsible 
for testing drug safety, had registered NVP as a safe drug. TAC argued that the 
government’s concern about the drug’s safety was baseless. The government policy 
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allowed for a small number of people with the financial means to access private health 
facilities to have access to this drug.  
 When the Constitutional Court heard the case, they agreed with TAC’s claim to 
assert the right to health and the rights of children. It was found that Sections 27 and 28 
of the South African Constitution create a positive obligation on the State to promote 
access to health care (Robins and von Lieres 2004). The Court went even further and 
determined that the government has a constitutional obligation to provide a 
comprehensive policy to combat mother-to-child HIV transmission and thus far has failed 
to meet that obligation. The outcome of this case asserted that the government does have 
a constitutional obligation to meet the positive duties stipulated in the Constitution in 
regards to access to health care. In the end, TAC received a positive outcome in the case 
of the Minister of Health v. TAC (2002) when the Court ruled in its favor. However, the 
outcome of the case could not have been possible without the provisions in the South 
African Constitution on health and child rights and the precedent case Grootbroom 
(2000). Once again, we see that democratization of South Africa paved the way for these 
rights to be asserted.  
 While this case was in the court, TAC mobilized over five thousand TAC 
supporters to march outside the Constitutional Court, and also conducted a series of 
“Stand Up for Your Rights” marches all over South Africa. On February 14, 2003, TAC 
held its largest march to date, with over 20,000 participants supporting TAC’s demand 
for a treatment plan. After all the victories TAC had experienced in its litigation against 
government and pharmaceutical companies, activism was fueled against perceived failure 
of government to address treatment access. This led to another civil disobedience 
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campaign in 2003. During this campaign, TAC made the claim that the Minister of 
Health and the South African government more generally were culpable for the deaths of 
the people who died from AIDS without treatment (TAC Diary 2008).  
 The government responded to TAC’s numerous demands for a treatment program 
with an announcement of extra budget appropriations for HIV/AIDS medical treatment. It 
was now time for the government to support ARV treatment and create a national 
treatment plan.  But the government refused to sign an agreement with the National 
Economic Development and Labor Council (NEDLAC) agreeing to an AIDS treatment 
plan and failed to fulfill their promises. TAC could not take this lightly and thus initiated 
another civil disobedience campaign.  
 This was a difficult maneuver for TAC to make, since civil disobedience is 
typically utilized against governments that the people do not support. The TAC agenda 
was one of “reform, not revolution” (De Waal 2007). Though danger of being viewed as 
anti-government was present, “TAC leadership judged that the campaign could be 
defended and conducted in a way which would not lose it the moral high ground” 
(Friedman and Mottiar 2004).  Seriously taking into consideration public support and key 
organizational allies, TAC initiated non-violent civil disobedience.  
 Finally in August 2003, the government agreed to a public ARV roll-out program, 
a more comprehensive national plan. In November 2003, the government presented the 
Operational Plan for Comprehensive Treatment and Care for HIV and AIDS Care, 
Management and Treatment for South Africa (the Operational Plan). Up until this point, 
TAC had fought relentlessly to force the government to create a treatment plan. Now that 
TAC had achieved this goal, a new goal was necessary. TAC shifted its focus from the 
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creation of a treatment plan to the implementation of the plan. From 2004 onward, TAC 
focused its political efforts on ensuring that the treatment plan was implemented. In 
addition to this political goal, TAC made more social goals: to campaign for expanded 




Shifting Focus: Policy Implementation and Prevention (2004 to 2008) 
 Recognizing all of its political victories, TAC decided to shift focus from the 
assertion of human rights to the implementation of the policies that were created through 
the victories in court. From 1998 to 2004, TAC spent much of its efforts fighting the 
political system that disenfranchised the HIV positive community by demanding 
affordable treatments and health policies for treatment programs. Now that these goals 
were achieved, TAC shifted gears to see that the programs were effective, providing 
treatment to those who need it.  
 Into the year 2004, TAC kept a close eye on government progress of the ARV 
roll-out. Understanding the significance of the roll-out program, TAC helped establish a 
joint civil society forum to monitor the government’s implementation of the Operational 
Plan. At this point, TAC had already created a number of partnerships with other 
organizations. These organizations teamed up with TAC to create the Joint Civil Society 
Monitoring and Evaluation Forum (the Forum).  The civil society organizations involved 
included the AIDS Law Project (ALP), Centre for Health Policy (CHP), Médecins Sans 
Frontières (MSF), and the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), just to name 
a few.  
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 For purposes of evaluating TAC’s overall “success,” I consider the creation of the 
Operational Plan as a positive outcome, as it helped TAC’s goal of ensuring that the 
government created a treatment plan. The Operational Plan is the result of the efforts of 
TAC in protests, resistance, and litigation. Now TAC’s goal is to see sufficient 
implementation of the treatment plan. Although, TAC’s focus has shifted from policy 
creation to policy implementation, their tactics have remained largely the same. Also, the 
creation of the forum demonstrates how TAC is altering its focus and implementing new 
strategies to achieve its goals.  
  Since February 2004, TAC began pressing the Minister of Health to release 
“Annex A,” which prescribes goals for the implementation of the plan, including dates, 
sites and targets for the ARV treatment roll-out. By October 2004, the Minister of Health 
still refused to disclose the information, even after the Annex was revised. At one point, 
the Minister denied it even existed. Without knowledge of the government’s plans and 
targets for the Operational Plan, TAC could not hold the government accountable to its 
promises. The information was key in order for TAC to assess the implementation of the 
policy. TAC launched the Access to Information Campaign and a court case to demand 
that the people have a right to know and that the government must release the 
information. TAC pointed to Section 32 of the South African Bill of Rights which states, 
“Everyone has the right of access to any information held by the state... that is required 
for the exercise or protection of any rights.”  
 In a pamphlet, “Right to Know, Right to Live,” TAC argued that the “access to 
information helps communities work with government to improve service delivery” 
(TAC 2004). By informing the public about their right to know, TAC once again used a 
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rights discourse to achieve its goal. In this campaign TAC conducted marches, 
demonstrations, consultations with civil society organizations, and ultimately legal action 
against the Minister of Health in the “Annex A Case” (Heywood 2009). In November 
2004, the Pretoria High ruled in favor of TAC’s right to access information and ordered 
the minister to pay punitive costs for misleading the public. Again, TAC scored another 
positive political outcome.  
 From here on, TAC continued to monitor implementation of the program, 
demanding better roll-out in places like Mpumalanga. Much effort was taken to 
document progress and produce reports on the roll-out program. This timely research was 
vital to ensure that the government was implementing the program in all provinces and 
servicing as many people as possible.  
 In 2006, TAC was in Court again, but this time against the Department of 
Correctional Services and the Ministry of Health for denying ARV treatment to prisoners 
in Westville Prison. In a September 2006, TAC’s Newsletter disclosed statistics on the  
number of deaths in South African prisons. The number of prisoners who have died in 
custody from natural causes has risen dramatically from 211 in 1996 to over 1500 in 
2005. TAC claimed that this increase in the prison mortality rate was directly attributable 
to HIV/AIDS and its intersection with tuberculosis (TB) (TAC 2006).  
 Again, the Court agreed with TAC in that the rights guaranteed in the South 
African Constitution applied to all South Africans. The Court ordered the government 
both to provide ARV treatment to prisoners and to submit a treatment plan for the 
prisoners. This victory, another positive outcome for TAC, again relied on the South 
African Constitution and the assertion of rights to win its claim.  
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 In 2007, continuing its emphasis on for prevention and implementation of 
treatment programs, TAC worked alongside the government to draft a National Strategic 
Plan for 2007-2011 for HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infections (NSP). This 
policy promised to reduce new HIV infections by 50% and to extend treatment to 80% of 
people living with HIV. The government quickly adopted the plan. TAC’s resources and 
research were crucial to developing a strategic plan for treatment and prevention. Without 
the help of TAC, the NSP would not have been created. Here, TAC achieved another 
positive outcome.  
Overall, TAC had many political successes, demonstrated by all the positive 
outcomes discussed above. This was a long process, in which TAC developed a complex 
relationship with the South African Government. The evolving relationship between the 
government and TAC shows a repertoire of tactics. While TAC worked alongside the 
government in the ARV roll-out and creation of the NSP, it also remained critical of the 
program’s implementation. TAC was always careful not to act as an ally to the 
government or to be too anti-government, understanding the importance of balancing 
cooperation and conflict in order to retain public support. I will show the interplay 
between the government and TAC to be even more dynamic later, in my discussion of 
AIDS denialism and government supported dissident science.  
Over the years, TAC has realized that mass mobilization and networking are key 
tools in their success, which in turn has created political space for the assertion of health 
rights and citizenship. Mass mobilization of women, unemployed people, and HIV-
positive individuals showed the government that its promises and obligations within the 
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Constitution must be met. Mobilization was the backbone to TAC’s success, a sentiment 
often reiterated by TAC co-founder, Nathan Geffen (Friedman and Mottiar 2004).  
These varied positive political outcomes are largely a result of the political 
opportunity structure. TAC, in turn framed its issues and goals in a manner that helped it 
capitalize on the favorable context in order to achieve positive outcomes. The 
institutional channels to make political demands were set in place post-apartheid, through 
the democratization of South Africa. The Courts provided direct and immediate means of 
engagement by TAC leaders, while public civil disobedience, protests, and marches 
allowed for involvement of thousands of South African citizens. The political opportunity 
provided by the new post-apartheid Constitution and South Africa’s strong human rights 
frame work informed the movement’s decision to create a rights frame. For TAC, the 
framing process was made possible by the existing political opportunity structure. The 
rights frame was vital to TAC’s political success. The continued reliance on claiming and 
fulfilling rights led TAC to employ litigation, marches, and protests, all of which had 
positive outcomes.  
 
Cultural and Social Outcome 
 
 TAC’s first decade was filled with numerous political victories. But as a social 
movement, TAC strived not only to influence policy making, but also to make sure that 
these policies were translated into practice in the social realm. While the political aspect 
of TAC’s work evolved around claiming and asserting rights, the social aspect involved 
battling stigma, discrimination, and AIDS denialism within society. Assessment of the 
social/cultural outcome will include intensive discussion of government-sponsored 
dissident AIDS science, including support of traditional healer Matthias Rath. I will also 
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examine TAC’s efforts to influence cultural perceptions and education on HIV/AIDS. 
TAC played a large role not only in the political realm of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in 
South Africa, but also in prioritizing the social aspects of the pandemic.  
In measuring whether success was achieved in the social and cultural spheres, I 
will examine the changes in common myths about AIDS and especially the effects of 
AIDS denialism. I will also examine TAC’s response to the commonly used medicines 
provided by traditional healers, closely exploring TAC’s relationship with Matthias Rath. 
An in-depth discussion of Rath will not only expose common beliefs about the disease, 
but also show what measures TAC took to combat false information. Furthermore, 
assessing the social outcome will require exploration of TAC’s initiatives at the 
grassroots level by examining the strategies and programs TAC implemented. We will 
see how TAC implemented grassroots meetings, training, and educational programs in 
order to combat HIV/AIDS stigma, misinformation, and discrimination.  
 
Countering AIDS Denialism  
 The realization of the HIV/AIDS epidemic spurred TAC to mobilize for treatment 
access. As seen in previous sections, TAC endured long battles with the South African 
government and multinational pharmaceutical companies to increase treatment access 
and ensure implementation of treatment policy. Yet at the same time, TAC was battling 
the disastrous effects of dissident AIDS science supported by President Mbeki and others. 
Moreover, traditional healers openly advertised and distributed various substances as 
“AIDS cures.” In this section, I will examine how TAC framed and tackled the issue of 
government supported AIDS denialism. 
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 Although dissident AIDS science began in the late 1980s, it did not gain 
momentum in South African until President Thabo Mbeki began to support it 
(Vandormael 2007). Mbeki’s argument was rooted in a national ideology to protect the 
African image from falling victim to Western perceptions that Africans are promiscuous 
or sexually deviant. Hence, Mbeki created HIV science based on nationalistic grounds, 
emphasizing an overall fear of being victimized by the West. Mbeki’s denialism in the 
Western biomedical model began to take drastic turns as he publicly denied the link 
between HIV/AIDS and deny the effectiveness of ARV treatment (See Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6. Zapiro cartoon featured in the Mail & Guardian on Nov 8, 1999 
 
 TAC was careful in the way it approached AIDS denialism. Throughout rural 
areas South Africa, little education and knowledge on HIV/AIDS science or treatment 
was available, the threat of AIDS denialism was much more severe. Therefore, TAC has 
to delicately frame its opposition to AIDS denialism so as to not fuel arguments that TAC 
was anti-government. Initially, TAC described the government’s “denial” as reluctance or 
apathy to see the urgency of the AIDS crisis and immediately respond (Vandormael 
56 
 
2007). Instead of labeling the government as “wrong,” TAC portrayed it as “morally 
weak” (Ibid).  
  But with the gravity of the AIDS crisis intensifying and no retraction in AIDS 
denialism, TAC turned to a more dramatic frame. At first, TAC claimed that public 
skepticism towards the science of HIV was a function of political, intellectual, and moral 
weakness. Then, TAC began to describe the President and Minister of Health’s beliefs 
and actions as “evil” and “murder.” Here a link was made between the contestation of 
internationally accepted AIDS science and culpability for death.  
 In order to combat AIDS denialism support by the government, TAC assembled 
and implemented what Vandormael (2007) refers to as its “Intellectual Campaign.” This 
campaign was primarily driven by an epistemic community, members of the professional 
and academic community who contributed their skills and knowledge to counter the 
unorthodox views of Mbeki and other AIDS denialists (Vandormael 2007). This 
campaign differed from TAC’s traditional campaigns because it did not involve public 
protest and other confrontational activities. Rather, the intellectual campaign turned to a 
high level of expert specialization on AIDS science to counter the rhetoric preached by 
the denialists.  
 The intellectual campaign occurred from 2000 through 2004, with the epistemic 
community playing a key role in pressing the government for a PMTCT program and 
litigation mentioned earlier. But in 2005, TAC launched the “2BY6 Campaign,” 
advocating for 200,000 HIV positive people to receive ARVs by 2006 (TAC Diary 
2008). This campaign also called on the government to denounce AIDS denialism and its 
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practitioners such as Matthias Rath.  But the government continued to support Rath and 
allowed him to sell vitamins as AIDS cures (See Figure 7).  
As TAC was marching and protesting  through the 2BY6 Campaign, Rath 
accused TAC of receiving funding from pharmaceutical companies. TAC then engaged in 
a legal battle with Rath for his slanderous accusations and also accused him of 
experimenting on human subjects. Here, TAC utilized the Medicines Act to support its  
 
Figure 7. Featured in the Mail & Guardian on Sept 21, 2005. 
 
claim against Rath’s unlawful distribution of unregistered drugs and his experimentation 
on humans. In 2006, the Court found that Rath had defamed TAC, which TAC 
considered a victory against AIDS denialism, particularly since the ruling would enhance 
TAC’s reputation at the grassroots level.  
Although, TAC won the case against Rath it can not be counted as a positive 
outcome unless it had implications in the social realm. In some sense there must have 
been positive implications on public beliefs on the denialists approach as the Court re-
validated TAC’s reputation. This would help TAC in its grassroots programs. 
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TAC’s most influential and most prized program is Treatment Literacy. This 
program is built and run by people at the local level to teach others in their community 
about HIV science and treatment. This educational program trains locals to be Treatment 
Literacy instructors who then reach out to people within the community. TAC highly 
prioritizes education. In order to ensure health citizenship, the people must be educated 
and knowledgeable. 
 
Figure 8. Featured in the Mail & Gaurdian  on 27 June 2005. 
  
 
Stigma and Discrimination  
 In order to decrease stigma and discrimination, TAC created the  “HIV 
POSITIVE” logo, printed on thousands and thousands of t-shirts which were worn at all 
of TAC’s protests and marches. TAC created the logo so that onlookers could not 
differentiate between who had HIV and who did not have HIV. The idea was that no one 
can know if someone else has HIV, and therefore should not act in a discriminatory 
manner towards them (personal conversation with Western Cape Provincial Coordinator, 
Fredalene Booysen 2008). Also, it is an even more powerful visible statement when 
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thousands of people congregate wearing HIV POSITIVE shirts on the streets of South 
Africa to demand treatment access.  
 TAC also regularly publishes newsletters, the magazine Equal Treatment, 
booklets and pamphlets to educate people about HIV/AIDS and related issues. 
Understanding the complexity of the epidemic and how it affects so many parts of life in 
addition to personal health, TAC adopts issues such as violence against women, and 
xenophobia against refugees. TAC also implements door-to-door pamphlet campaigns 
and “Cool Youth” HIV/AIDS education programs in local schools.  
 These efforts have helped to make HIV/AIDS a higher priority among South 
Africans, as reflected by recent public opinion data. Results from the Afrobarometer polls 
conducted between 1999 and 2004 suggest that HIV/AIDS has moved up the ladder of 
what the public thinks the government should prioritize. This increase in prioritization 
may be a reflection of people’s personal experience with the disease. From 2000 to 2004, 
the percent of the South African population which had experienced personal loss due to 
AIDS rose from 16 to 31 percent.  
 Overall, determining the social outcome is not as concrete as determining positive 
political outcome, owing to the subjectivity of the matter and the lack of public opinion 
data. Nonetheless, TAC has made significant strides even at the grassroots level. The 
ability of TAC to mobilize thousands of people for protests and marches shows that its 
actions at the social level are stirring people to support TAC’s goals. The growth of 
TAC’s programs also shows that people at the grassroots level are willing to lend their 
support and services. With some reservation, I would thus conclude that TAC has 




 TAC’s objective to attain treatment access for more South Africans was 
successful. The numerous positive political outcomes show that TAC was able to press 
the South African government to create policies and battle multinational pharmaceutical 
companies for more affordable drugs. However, when it comes to the social outcomes, 
determining success is less clear. TAC wanted to increase education on HIV/AIDS, 
which it has done through its Treatment Literacy program. But whether stigma and 
discrimination decreased can not be quantitatively stated.  
 My research on TAC’s activities and outcomes leads me to conclude that TAC 
has been highly successful, particularly in its earlier years. But in the latter years, from 
2004 to the present, the ambiguity of its goals makes it much more difficult to determine 





TAC has certainly demonstrated a wide variety of tactics and strategies, targeting 
all aspects of the multi-dimensional issues raised by the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the South 
Africa. TAC has utilized its institutional structure and networks to affect not only the 
policy aspect of the epidemic but also the social and grassroots service related aspects of 
the epidemic. TAC’s well-roundedness helped to mobilize thousands and won 
international acclaim and support.  
Though many of TAC’s events and activities were covered in this paper, many 
more were left out. Not being able to examine and include analysis of even more of 
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TAC’s work may have limited the parameters for determining TAC’s success. Also, the 
unavailability of public opinion data made it difficult to access the social outcome.  
However, TAC’s unusual social movement approach may serve as a model for 
other social movements. The complexity of the HIV/AIDS epidemic has required a well-
rounded and comprehensive advocacy approach, which TAC developed.  Though TAC 
has achieved many legal victories, how these victories will translate into action at the 
social level still remains to be discovered. Considering the range of the epidemic and the 
thousands who still need treatment, TAC’s work is far from over. Hopefully, its success 
































TAC Income (1999-2008) 
 
Fiscal Year Income Expenditure 
(Deficit)/ Surplus 
for the Year 
1999-2000 R 202,719 R 215, 981 R (13,262) 
2000-01 R 1,844,302 R 1,351,434 R 492,868 
2001-02 R 6,433,603 R 3,734,709 R 2,698,894 
2002-03 R 9,397,845 R 10,814,913 R (1,417,068) 
2003-04 R 14,429,363 R 13,567,776 R 861,587 
2004-05 R 22,122,678 R 19,340,525 R 2,782,153 
2005-06 R 27,303,419 R 29,824,479 R (2,521,060) 
2006-07 R 27,641,896 R 29,138,367 R (1,496,471) 
2007-08 R 36,699,997 R 37,268,958 R (568,961) 
 
Source: TAC Audit Records available at http://www.tac.org.za/community/finance 































Timeline of the Treatment Action Campaign and other related events (1998 – 2008) 
 
10 December 1998 – TAC launched on International Human Rights day in Cape Town, 
with a small demonstration for the right to treatment.  
21 March 1999 – Human Rights Day, South Africa. TAC holds first demonstrations of 
people with HIV to demand a national PMTCT programme in three cities.  
24 March 1999 – TAC holds its first meeting with ANC Minister of Health, Dr 
Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, and issues statement on the need to reduce ARV drug prices. 
Although the meeting was positive, soon after this relations between the TAC and the 
government began to deteriorate.  
1999 – Thabo Mbeki replaces Nelson Mandela as South Africa's second president. Dr 
Manto Tshabalala-Msimang is appointed as Health Minister.  
January 2000 – TAC files papers to join as amicus curiae on the side of the South African 
(SA) Government in the litigation concerning the challenge to South Africa's Medicines 
Act by international pharmaceutical companies (the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' 
Association – PMA).  
5 March 2000 – TAC leads a march of 5,000 people to the Pretoria High Court on the 
first day of the PMA court case.  
19 April 2000 – The PMA withdraws its case against the SA Government under public 
pressure and after TAC had been admitted to the case by the court.  
July 2000 – TAC organizes global march for treatment at the start of the International 
AIDS conference in Durban. The march is widely understood to have been a turning point 
in acceptance of the right of access to treatment for people in Africa and other developing 
countries.  
March 2001 – TAC holds its First National Congress in Soweto attended by nearly 500 
activists.  
July 2001 – TAC launches Christopher Moraka Defiance Campaign to challenge the 
patenting and pricing of the anti-fungal medicine, Fluconazole. The campaign is named 
after a TAC member who died as a result of the unaffordability of Fluconazole.  
21 August 2001 – TAC files legal papers against the SA Government regarding its failure 
to provide ARVs to PMTCT.  
October 2001 – The Bredell Consensus Statement on Access to ARV treatment is 
launched by TAC and international scientists after a conference that brought activists and 
scientists together.  
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18 December 2001 – The Pretoria High Court rules in favour of TAC on PMTCT and 
orders the government to roll out a programme on PMTCT. The government appeals the 
order.  
2 May 2002 – 5,000 TAC supporters march past the Constitutional Court on the day of its 
hearing of the appeal in the PMTCT case.  
5 July 2002 – South Africa's Constitutional Court hands down a landmark ruling in 
favour of TAC and the right of access to healthcare services. One of the Constitutional 
Court judge reports that he cried after the decision was made public.  
September 2002 – TAC files a complaint with the Competition Commission concerning 
the conduct and excessive pricing by multi-national pharmaceutical giants Boehringer 
Ingelheim and GSK of three essential ARV medicines.  
November/December 2002 – TAC involved in negotiations with business, labour, and 
government to try to agree on a National Treatment Plan. The negotiations are sabotaged 
by the government and ultimately unsuccessful.  
February 2003 – TAC leads march of 20,000 to the South African Parliament on the day 
of the Presidential state of the nation address to demand a national treatment programme.  
 
TAC’s largest march of 20,000+ people on 14 February 2003. 
21 March 2003 – TAC launches its civil disobedience campaign against the ANC 
government to protest at the 600 deaths per day taking place as a result of HIV infection.  
April 2003 – The civil disobedience campaign is suspended after hundreds of arrests and 
an offer by the ANC to begin to talk to TAC again. TAC's suspension of its campaign is 
made conditional on progress towards a National Treatment Plan.  
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August 2003 – TAC holds its Second National Congress in Durban and decides to 
relaunch civil disobedience.  
9 August 2003 – The SA Government announces a cabinet decision to develop a national 
ARV treatment plan. At this point, no people are officially receiving treatment in the 
public health sector.  
10 December 2003 – Out of court settlements are announced between TAC, GSK, and 
Boehringer Ingelheim regarding TAC's complaint to the Competition Commission. The 
companies agree to issue seven voluntary licenses for the drugs, increasing competition 
and bringing down prices.  
2 July 2004 – TAC turns its attention to broader issues around health systems and holds a 
national conference to make demands for a ‘People's Health Service’.  
November 2004 – Pretoria High Court rules in favour of TAC's right of access to 
information and awards punitive damages against the Minister of Health (the Annex A 
case) for withholding information about the implementation plan for ARV treatment.  
September 2005 – TAC holds its Third National Congress. By this time less than 100,000 
people are on treatment. TAC has 20,000 volunteers. 
5 July 2006 – Judgments are handed down in favour of TAC in its case demanding access 
to ARV treatment for prisoners at Westville prison in Durban, KwaZulu Natal.  
August 2006 – TAC protests at the International AIDS Conference in Toronto lead to SA 
Government muzzling the Minister of Health and seeking a new relationship with TAC.  
27–28 October 2006 – TAC and its allies in the trade unions, churches, and NGOs hold a 
national civil society congress on an HIV prevention and treatment plan. The Congress is 
addressed by the Deputy President of South Africa.  
1 December 2006, World AIDS Day – TAC and the government announce the creation of 
a strengthened National AIDS Council (SANAC).  
January – May 2007 – TAC closely involved in the drafting of an NSP on HIV/AIDS that 
proposes to put two million people on treatment by 2011 and cut new HIV infections by 
50 percent.  
4 May 2007 – The NSP is endorsed by the Cabinet.  
7 November 2007 – TAC files a new complaint with the Competition Commission, this 
time against Merk Sharp and Dohme (MSD) over its refusal to license the ARV drug, 
Efavirenz, on reasonable terms.  
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9 November 2007 – TAC organizes mass demonstration to highlight the TB crisis in 
South Africa.  
March 2008 – TAC hold Fourth National Congress. By this time, 450,000 people are on 
treatment in the public health sector. TAC debates new approaches to campaign for the 
right to health.  
1 June 2008 – TAC announces that MSD has agreed to license Efavirenz on reasonable 
terms, leading to price reductions.  
13 June 2008 – TAC wins its case against Matthias Rath, who is ordered by the Court to 
stop unregistered ‘clinical trials’ and publishing advertisements claiming that vitamins 
cure AIDS.  
September 2008 – South African President Thabo Mbeki is removed as President of 
South Africa by the ANC. South Africa's Health Minister is replaced in a Cabinet 
reshuffle. 
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